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I. OVERVIEW
This article discusses the right of publicity, beginning in Part II with
the difficulty in defining a legal right of publicity, and the resulting various
legal doctrines upon which the right has been analyzed. Part III discusses
four types of actions commonly involving publicity rights. Part IV presents
a theoretical background, discussing four of the legal theories under which
the right of publicity has been analyzed, and also the underlying policies
common to copyright and publicity right protection. The application of
copyright law to right of publicity cases is discussed in Part V, and Part VI
discusses the two primary limitations to the right of publicity doctrine:
descendibility and First Amendment conflicts. Part VII then ends with a
summary, conclusion, and recommendation.
II. INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is, basically, the right to own, protect, and profit
from the commercial value of one's name, likeness, activities, or identity,
and to prevent the unauthorized exploitation of these traits by others.'
1. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The right of publicity
has also been described as: "a valuable proprietary right, a kind of property right in [a
person's] name and image, and.., an exclusive right to market it, to assign it, or to benefit
from its use commercially." Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323,
1330 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), afj'd, 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978); the right giving a person
"personal control over commercial display and exploitation of his personality and the exercise
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Disputes involving right of publicity issues commonly arise out of the
unauthorized commercial exploitation of a celebrity's name or likeness in
advertisements, endorsements, or commercial merchandising of items such
as T-shirts or posters.
The right of publicity has not yet been fully developed or uniformly
applied as a legal doctrine. The right is not specifically recognized by the
United States Constitution or the Bill of Rights, nor is there any federal
codification to govern it, such as the federal copyright, trademark, and
patent laws. In the absence of such federal guidelines, courts must then
look to state statutes and common law to decide right of publicity cases.
Many states, however, do not recognize or even address the right of
publicity statutorily, and may have no substantive common law on the topic.
In addition, there are few secondary sources, such as treatises, restatements,
or uniform codes for the courts to turn to for guidance.2 Courts are thus
left with minimal standards by which to interpret publicity rights, and must
often turn to other states' common law. The result is that courts are often
free, or forced, to create new law, which leads to inconsistency and a lack
of predictability regarding the right of publicity.
Protecting a person's likeness does not fit neatly into one specific legal
category, as it involves elements of tort, copyright, property, contract, and
labor law. It must also be weighed against First Amendment rights.
Although the right of publicity has traditionally been analyzed under the
of his talents." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977);
"the publicity value of one's name or likeness." Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); "in addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy ... a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph[s] .... here, as often elsewhere, the
tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary
worth." Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); and "the right to be free from having one's name, likeness, and
identifying characteristics expropriated for commercial purposes without consent." J. Eugene
Salomon, Jr., The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1179, 1179 (1987).
2. Nimmer & Nimmer's six-volume treatise on copyright law devotes only one small
subsection, under "invasion of privacy and publicity." MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01 [B][c] (1994). Neither Dean Prosser's nor Dean
Keeton's renowned treatises on torts address the matter directly. See W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEErON]; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed.
1971). There is, however, one treatise which focuses directly on the right of publicity. See
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY (1994).
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common law right of privacy,3 courts and plaintiffs have also applied other
bodies of law, such as unfair competition,4 misappropriation,' dilution,6
and contract7 in order to recognize a protectable interest in the monetary
value of names and personal features. These factors further contribute to the
lack of uniformity or consistency in publicity right cases.
III. FOUR TYPES OF ACTIONS WHERE THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY ARISES
Right of publicity issues usually involve at least one of four general
types of infringements: 1) appropriation of one's name or likeness for
advertising or endorsement; 2) unauthorized use of one's name or likeness
on commercial products; 3) appropriation of one's unique style or character-
istics; and 4) appropriation of one's performance.
A. Appropriation for Advertising or Endorsement
Right of publicity infringements commonly arise when a celebrity's
name or likeness is used, without authorization, to advertise or endorse a
product or service. This type of exploitation results in several forms of
harm:
1) It creates a false impression that the celebrity endorses the product
or has a business relation with the product or manufacturer;
2) It may inhibit the celebrity's ability to obtain other endorsement
opportunities, especially from competing brands;
3) It may undermine the celebrity's credibility and, therefore, his or
her marketability, especially if the celebrity becomes overexposed, or if the
advertisement or the product itself arouses controversy or negative feelings;
3. See Harold R. Gordon, Right ofProperty in Name, Likeness, Personality and History,
55 Nw. U. L. REv. 553 (1960); see also infra text accompanying notes 54-64.
4. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); Wyatt
Earp Enter., Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Lone Ranger, Inc. v.
Currey, 79 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Pa. 1948); Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, cert. denied, 257
U.S. 654 (1921).
5. See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562.
6. See, e.g., Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159
(C.D. Cal. 1976).
7. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 433 (Cal. 1979); infra text
accompanying notes 65-71; see also Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 (C.C. Mass.
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4) It unjustly enriches the infringer, who reaps the benefits of the
celebrity's good will or fame without paying for that benefit;
5) It penalizes those sponsors who do legitimately pay for the
celebrity's endorsement;
6) Most important (to the celebrity), it deprives the celebrity of fees
and royalties.
A typical example of an unauthorized use of a celebrity's name in an
advertisement is Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc.,' where the defendant
used, without authorization, golfer Ben Hogan's name and picture to help
promote sales of its book. Although Mr. Hogan was successful in his
challenge,9 other celebrities have not always received such protection. In
Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Savings,0 for instance,
comedian Johnny Carson attempted to prevent a Nebraska bank from using
his name in an advertisement promoting a trip to Las Vegas. Although the
bank had clearly appropriated Carson's name without his permission, Carson
was still denied relief, because Nebraska law did not yet recognize a right
of publicity." Johnny Carson had better luck, however, in a later case,
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 2 where he sought to enjoin
the defendant's product name and marketing slogan, "Here's Johnny." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld Carson's
publicity rights, finding the defendant's use of "Here's Johnny" constituted
an appropriation of Carson's identity."
These two Johnny Carson cases exemplify the lack of consistency and
predictability in right of publicity cases. The Nebraska bank blatantly used
Carson's name and picture in its advertisements and brochures, which
infringed upon Carson's right of publicity far more directly and extensively
than the toilet company's use of the "Here's Johnny" slogan, which never
even used Carson's name or picture. Carson was, however, unsuccessful
against the bank, yet found relief against the toilet company. This apparent
dichotomy exists not because of the factual or legal issues involved, but
merely because the right of publicity was recognized as a legal cause of
action in Michigan, but not in Nebraska.
8. 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957).
9. Mr. Hogan prevailed on his claim. Id. at 320.
10. 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974).
11. Id. at 1084-86.
12. 498 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1980), vacated, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
13. Carson, 698 F.2d at 836. Although Michigan law had not yet recognized the right
of publicity, the Sixth Circuit, in remanding to the district courtflushedaway the lower court
decision, predicting that Michigan courts would adopt the right. Id. at 834, n.1.
1995] 1017
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B. Unauthorized Use of a Name or Likeness on a Commercial
Product
Right of publicity infringements frequently involve the unauthorized
use of a celebrity's name or likeness on commercial products such as T-
shirts or posters. The first case to recognize the right of publicity, Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 4 involved such commer-
cial memorabilia. Other leading right of publicity cases have involved
unauthorized commercial memorabilia such as statuettes 5 and memorial
posters of Elvis Presley, 6 and plastic busts of Martin Luther King, Jr.'
C. Appropriation of a Person's Unique Style or Characterizations
Right of publicity protection may go beyond a person's name and
likeness, and extend to his unique character, characterization, or personal
style. This recognition of a person's unique style differentiates publicity
rights from other more tangible intellectual properties such as copyrights,
trademarks, and patents.'
The first case to apply the right of publicity to a performer's style was
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 9 where Elvis Presley's estate succeeded in
stopping the defendant's stage production, "The Big El Show," which
featured an Elvis impersonator who duplicated an Elvis concert.2" Less
than six months after the Russen decision, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York recognized protection of the Marx
Brothers' characters in Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co.,
14. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (recognizing a common law right of publicity in photographs,
specifically, photos on trading cards of professional baseball players).
15. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980).
16. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979), rev'd, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); see
infra text accompanying notes 150-51.
17. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd, 694 F.2d 674 (1 1th Cir. 1983); see infra text
accompanying note 156.
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.12.
19. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
20. Id. at 1348. The plaintiffs sought to prevent the defendant from using the name
"The Big El Show," as well as "the image or likeness or persona of Elvis Presley [and any
of the various names by which Presley is popularly known] on any goods, in any promotional
materials, in any advertising or in connection with the offering or rendering of any musical
services." Id. at 1344.
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Inc.,21 where a satirical musical play imitated the famous comedians. The
court held the defendant's play was an infringement of the Marx Brothers'
unique characteristics and style,22 concluding the play had "reproduced [the
Marx Brothers'] manner of performances by imitating their style and
appearance... [thus] infring[ing] the plaintiffs rights of publicity in the
Marx Brothers characters." '23 The Laurel and Hardy characters have also
received similar protection under the right of publicity. In Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, Inc.,24 the court specifically recognized the actors' publicity
rights included the impersonation of their physical likenesses or appearances,
costumes and mannerisms, and/or the simulation of their voices for
advertising or commercial purposes.25 The Price holding was later relied
upon in a similar case, brought by the same plaintiff to prevent unauthorized
imitation of the Laurel and Hardy characters in the television show Stan 'n
Ollie.26 The court granted the injunction, again recognizing the publicity
rights in the comedians' appearances and mannerisms.27 California courts
have also recognized the legal protection of a celebrity's style as far back
as 1928, when an appellate court prevented an unauthorized imitation of
Charlie Chaplin's distinct "characterizations and expressions." '28
More recently, courts have extended publicity rights to grant protection
against unauthorized vocal imitations. Singer Bette Midler, for example,
successfully challenged an unauthorized imitation of her voice used in a
Ford Motors commercial, 29 and a vocal imitation of singer Tom Waits was
likewise found to infringe upon his publicity rights." It is interesting to
note how the right of publicity has evolved to protect against vocal
imitation, when as recently as 1971 the right of publicity did not protect
21. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
22. Id. at 493-94.
23. Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
24. 400 F. Supp 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
25. Id. at 843.
26. Price v. Worldvision Enter., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 603 F.2d
214 (2d Cir. 1979).
27. Id. at 256.
28. Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928). But see Sinatra v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 712 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971)
(denying singerNancy Sinatra's claim that the defendant's television commercial, which used
the music to "These Boots Are Made For Walkin'," imitated her dress, mannerisms, and style
of delivery).
29. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom.
Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1513-14 (1992).
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Nancy Sinatra against the blatant imitation of her voice, dress, style, and
mannerism.3
These holdings demonstrate how the right of publicity may be extended
beyond the actors' physical traits, to protect their acting styles or fictional
creations. These cases also exemplify how courts may turn to the right of
publicity in order to find some protection for performers, perhaps confusing
the creators with their characterizations, because other bodies of law, such
as copyright or trademark, do not provide adequate protection.32
D. Appropriation of an Actor's Performance
The fourth and least common type of publicity right infringement
involves the unauthorized use or appropriation of the actor's live perfor-
mance itself, rather than his or her unique style, as discussed supra.
Because statutory copyright law does not protect a live performance which
has not been fixed in a tangible medium of expression, performers turn to
the right of publicity to find protection for their performances.33 This type
of appropriation was at issue in the first and only right of publicity case
decided by the United States Supreme Court, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.34 Plaintiff Hugo Zacchini, a human cannonball perform-
er, alleged that the defendant had usurped his right of publicity by airing a
fifteen-second broadcast of his performance on a local news telecast without
his permission. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mr. Zacchini,
recognizing a right of publicity in an actor's performance, and further
recognizing that this right was violated by the unauthorized broadcast of the
performance.36
Zacchini stands apart from most right of publicity cases, in that: 1) it
was the first right of publicity case to be decided by the United States
31. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712 (denying relief despite the defendant's use, in a tire
commercial, of a singer whose voice, style, and even boots were deliberately intended to
imitate Sinatra's).
32. The usual rationale is that human characterizations cannot be copyrighted apart from
some "work." See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.12.
33. Although section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 lists the right to perform a work
as one of the exclusive rights held by an owner of a copyright, statutory copyright law does
not protect works which are not fixed in a tangible medium of expression, such as live
choreographic works, jazz improvizations, and other "unfixed" performances. Thus, if the
work is the performance, it may not be protected by statutory copyright. See 17 U.S.C. §
301 (1988).
34. 433 U.S. 562.
35. Id. at 563-64.
36. Id. at 574-76.
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Supreme Court; 2) it is still the only such United States Supreme Court case
to date; 3) it involved appropriation of a live performance, while most
publicity right cases involve infringement of a person's name, likeness, or
style; 4) Mr. Zacchini was relatively unknown, where almost all other cases
involve well-known celebrities; 5) Mr. Zacchini was alive and asserting his
own publicity rights, whereas many other cases are brought by the estate or
license holder of a celebrity who is deceased; 37 and 6) the First Amend-
ment was more at issue than in most publicity cases, because this infringe-
ment involved a newscast, rather than a commercial exploitation.38
IV. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: FOUR PUBLICITY RIGHT
THEORIES AND THE UNDERLYING POLICIES BEHIND COPYRIGHT
AND PUBLICITY RIGHT LAW
A. Lugosi v. Universal-Four Right of Publicity Theories
The right of publicity was thoroughly analyzed in the 1979 landmark
case, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,39 where the California Supreme Court
proffered the four models under which the right of publicity may be
analyzed. Because Lugosi still stands as the seminal right of publicity
case,40 a more in-depth analysis is warranted.
Bela Lugosi portrayed Count Dracula in Universal Pictures' 1931
motion picture, Dracula. Although the character of Dracula has been
37. Most leading right of publicity cases have been brought by the estate of a deceased
celebrity, including Bela Lugosi, Elvis Presley, The Marx Brothers, Laurel and Hardy, Martin
Luther King, Jr., Charlie Chaplin, and Agatha Christie. See descendibility discussion, infra
text accompanying notes 138-56.
38. The First Amendment issue is addressed in Part VI of this article. See infra text
accompanying notes 157-87. For a more detailed analysis of the Zacchini case and its
implications, see generally Thomas H. Hannigan, Jr., FirstAmendment TheoryApplied to the
Right of Publicity, 17 PUB. ENT. ADVERT. & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 339 (1979); Pamela
Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity
and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983).
39. 603 P.2d 425.
40. For a more in-depth analysis of Lugosi and its progeny, see generally, Jon B.
Eisenberg, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity, 17 PUB. ENT.
ADvERT. & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 311 (1979); David R. Ginsberg, Transfer of the Right of
Publicity: Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 UCLA L. REv. 1103 (1975);
Miles P. Zatkowsky, Dracula Draws Blood from the Right of Publicity, 15 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 181 (1981); Stephen F. Rohde, Dracula: Still Undead; (UnresolvedRight-of-Publicity
Questions Are Sure to Haunt the Courts), CAL. LAW., Apr. 1985, at 51-55.
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portrayed in many different fashions by many different actors,' it was
Lugosi's portrayal which has defined the popular image of Dracula, and left
the most memorable impression.42 During the early 1960s, Universal
began licensing the Count Dracula character to various commercial
merchandisers, resulting in a plethora of T-shirts, masks, toys, models,
lunchboxes, and other items bearing Lugosi's distinct image of Dracula.
Lugosi's estate43 then sought injunctive relief and recovery of Universal's
profits, claiming Universal was exploiting a valuable property right
belonging to Bela's estate.44 In determining whether the plaintiffs could
assert a postmortem right to Bela's portrayal of the Dracula character, the
Supreme Court of California delineated four different theories under which
the right of value45 to one's name and likeness may be analyzed: 1)
property; 2) privacy; 3) work product; and 4) copyright.
1. Property-The Trial Court's View
The Lugosi trial court interpreted the right of publicity to constitute a
property right.46  The property theory recognizes the right to one's
commercially valuable name and likeness as a possessory right, which
accrues as the fruits of one's labor.47 This right, therefore, belongs to its
creator, who has the right to profit from, as well as manage and control the
likeness and image.
The property theory was also the basis for the court's decision in
Haelan,48 the first case to recognize the right of publicity. Haelan
41. This includes Gary Oldman's portrayal in Columbia Pictures' recent (Fall 1992)
Oscar-winning release, BRAM STOKER'S DRACULA.
42. LES DANIELS, LIVING IN FEAR: A HISTORY OF HORROR IN THE MASS MEDIA 130
(1975). The Lugosi character, with slicked-back black hair, rich Hungarian accent, and
piercing eyes differs tremendously from the white-haired, shabby, mustachioed old man
described by DRACULA'S author, Brain Stoker. Id. See also IVAN BUTLER, HORROR IN THE
CINEMA 42 (2d ed. 1970).
43. Bela died in 1956. Apparently the actor, unlike his character, could not come back
to assert his rights. Lugosi's widow, Hope Linninger Lugosi, and son, Bela George Lugosi,
were awarded all causes of action belonging to the estate.
44. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541, 542 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1972), rev'd. 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1975), and vacated, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
45. Dean Prosser is credited with creating the "right of value" term, which was used by
the Lugosi majority. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428; see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 117,
at 854.
46. Lugosi, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 551.
47. See Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970).
48. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 866.
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represents a landmark precedent in recognizing a proprietary right of
publicity distinct from a privacy right:
[I]n addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy... a man has
a right in the publicity value of his photograph[s] .... [H]ere, as often
elsewhere, the tag "property" simply symbolizes the fact that courts
enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth. This right might be called
a "right of publicity."49
New York courts have followed the Haelan decision, finding the right
of publicity to be a proprietary right." As the Lugosi court recognized,5'
a very significant consequence of labeling the right of publicity as a
property right is that it confers two additional rights: assignability 2 and
descendibility 3
2. Privacy-The Appellate Majority's View
Right of publicity issues have most often been construed under the right
of privacy doctrine. 4 Rather than emphasizing the commercial right to
control one's image, as the property theory does, the privacy model 55
mainly protects a person's "right to be let alone."56 The right of privacy
theory was first conceived in an 1890 law review article,57 and was later
49. Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., Price v. Worldvision, 455 F. Supp. at 257; Price v. Hal Roach, 400 F.
Supp. at 844.
51. Lugosi, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 551; see also Price v. Hal Roach, 400 F. Supp. at
844.
52. See, e.g., Haelan, 202 F.2d at 867.
53. See, e.g., Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1355. The descendibility issue is discussed in Part
VI of this article; see also infra text accompanying notes 138-56.
54. See, e.g., Factors, 579 F.2d at 220; Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
68 (Ga. 1905); Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (1902) (finding the use
of a young lady's picture to advertise a product (flour), without her knowledge or permission,
violated her right of privacy).
55. See generally. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.01 [B]; Gordon, supra note 3;
Victor A. Kovner et al., Recent Developments in Intrusion, Private Facts, False Light, and
Commercialization Claims, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1994 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 400, 1994).
56. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 205 (1890).
57. Id. The right of publicity was not judicially recognized, however, until 1953, in
Haelan, 202 F.2d 866. See Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the
Portrayal ofReal People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1581 (1979) [hereinafter Felcher
1995] 1023
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expanded by Dean Prosser, who, in his 1960 law review article, identified
four distinct kinds of intrusions into a plaintiff's privacy interests which
could be protected:"8
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness. 9
The Lugosi appellate court relied upon the privacy model, which the
Supreme Court of California majority also adopted. This analysis proved
monumental, in that it directly contradicts the Haelan conclusion that the
right of publicity is completely separate and distinct from the right of
privacy.60  The Lugosi interpretation results in certain benefits to the
plaintiff, as privacy actions, under tort law, can offer several advantages
over property law. As a tort action, a privacy infringement allows for
punitive and emotional damages which may not be available through other
remedies. It also provides an already developed body of case law, as well
as numerous treatises and restatements 61 which may provide some consis-
tency and predictability to an otherwise murky area of law.
The advantages of the right of privacy analysis are, however, out-
weighed by its inherent disadvantages. First, and perhaps most important,
the privacy theory does not recognize publicity rights as descendible. Under
the privacy model, the exploited person's privacy rights terminate upon his
or her death, and third parties, including family members, may not claim a
legal interest in the deceased's emotional or dignitary interests. This
weakness is particularly apparent in the right of publicity context, which
tends to be dominated by actions brought by the estates of deceased
celebrities.6z
& Rubin I].
58. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); see also PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 2, § 117, at 851.
59. Prosser, supra note 58, at 389. The fourth interest listed is the one most relevant
to right of publicity actions.
60. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868; see supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
61. See, e.g., PROssER & KEETON, supra note 2.
62. See supra note 37. The descendibility issue is discussed further in part VI of this
article; see also infra text accompanying notes 138-56.
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Second, the "invasion of privacy" rationale may not be appropriate for
celebrities, who thrive on public exposure and publicity. Infringers are
quick to invoke a waiver defense, arguing that public figures assume the risk
of exploitation and waive their privacy rights as part of the price of entering
the public arena. The waiver defense does have some merit in certain
circumstances, particularly in slander and libel cases,6" but should not be
used to deny anyone protection from the unauthorized exploitation of their
name or likeness.
A third inherent flaw lies within the general policies underlying the two
doctrines. The right of privacy is primarily meant to protect personal
interests (i.e., a person's mental and emotional well-being), whereas the
right of publicity is, or should be, primarily intended to protect the person's
proprietary and financial interests. The privacy theory may therefore not
be the appropriate way in which to interpret publicity rights.
A fourth potential weakness is that the privacy theory would deny
human owners the ability to assert a right of publicity for property which
has no privacy right, such as an animal, inanimate object, or institution. Yet
another disadvantage is that under the privacy model, a person's publicity
rights are considered dignitary, rather than proprietary, therefore denying
one the ability to transfer or assign publicity rights to others.
The inherent flaws of determining publicity rights under the right of
privacy model have spawned a continuous flurry of criticism over the
Lugosi ruling.64 By classifying the right of publicity as a privacy right, the
Lugosi majority has drastically limited the availability of right of publicity
actions, as it essentially denies standing to all estates of deceased persons.
3. Work Product-The Concurrence's View
The third theory elicited by the Lugosi court was the work product
model, as espoused by Justice Mosk in his concurrence. Under the work
product analysis, an actor is an employee of the studio, and is paid to create
63. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226
(1983); Martin Luther King, 508 F. Supp. at 863; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
2, § 113, at 805; RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2.06 (1994).
64. See Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868; see also Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 57, at 1588-89;
Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibilityof the Right of Publicity: Is There
CommercialLifeAfterDeath?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1128 (1980) [hereinafter Felcher & Rubin
II]; Ginsberg, supra note 40; Gordon, supra note 3, at 555-57; Melville B. Nimmer, The
Right ofPublicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204-10 (1954); Lionel S. Sobel, Count
Dracula and the Right ofPublicity, 47 L.A.B. ASS'N BULL. 373, 377-78 (1972); Zatkowsky,
supra note 40, at 181-90; Rohde, supra note 40.
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a product-the portrayal of a character, which then belongs to the employer,
rather than the actor. According to Justice Mosk, Lugosi did not obtain any
proprietary rights in his Dracula image because the image of the character
Count Dracula, rather than the actor Bela Lugosi, was marketed, 65 and an
employee's creation in the course of his employment belongs to the
employer, pursuant to the California Labor Code.6 6 Lugosi's portrayal of
Dracula was part of his employment contract with Universal, who owned the
fruits of the employee's labor67 under California labor law. As Justice
Mosk concluded, "[m]erely playing a role . . . creates no inheritable
property right in an actor .... "68
Justice Mosk did, however, recognize that an actor may claim a right
to the exclusive use of his portrayal of a character when the actor also
creates that character. Thus, an inheritable property interest will vest for an
actor's creation of a marketable character, but not for mere performance.69
This philosophy has been used to protect the characters created by
performers such as Groucho Marx7° and Laurel and Hardy.7'
4. Copyright-The Dissent's View
The fourth method of interpreting the right of publicity involves
analyzing it under copyright law. The Lugosi dissent, lead by Chief Justice
Bird,72 adopted this approach, concluding that "the right of publicity
recognizes an interest in intangible property similar in many respects to
65. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431-34 (Mosk, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 433. California labor law provided that: "Everything which an employee
acquires by virtue of his employment, except the compensation which is due to him from his
employer, belongs to the employer, whether acquired ... during or after.., the term of his
employment." Id. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (West 1971)).
67. Id. at 433. Universal's employment contract with Lugosi gave Universal the right
to exploit "any and all of the artist's acts, poses, plays and appearances of any and all kinds
. . . [and] to use and give publicity to the artist's name and likeness, photographic or
otherwise ... in connection with the advertising ... of [the film]." Id. at 426-27 n.2.
68. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 432. The trial court rejected the work product argument, finding
Universal had contracted for Bela's performance, which was separate and apart from the
commercial rights to his name and likeness, for which Universal had not contracted. Lugosi,
172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 543-44.
69. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 432.
70. Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. at 485; see supra text accompanying notes 21-
23.
71. Price v. Hal Roach, 400 F. Supp. 836; see supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
72. Chief Justice Bird was joined in her dissent by Justices Tobriner and Manuel.
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creations protected by copyright law, [and therefore] that body of law is
instructive."73
A major advantage for plaintiffs through the copyright analogy is that,
unlike the privacy model, the right of publicity becomes descendible unto
the estate of the owner.74 Justice Bird suggested this monopoly on the
control of a person's name and likeness should fall into the public domain
after a fixed period, as does a copyright, and further suggested adopting the
same term of "life of the author and fifty years after the author's death" of
copyright law as the standard time period.75 Furthermore, the underlying
policies of copyright law are compatible with the right of publicity, as
discussed below.
B. Underlying Policies of Copyright and Publicity Right Law
1. Overall Goals and Objectives
Adopting the copyright model to the right of publicity reflects the
underlying policy behind copyright law: to promote creative expression76
while accommodating the free exchange of ideas and information.77
Copyright law attempts to realize this goal through two general objectives:
providing economic incentives to the creator, and preventing unjust
enrichment. In deciding right of publicity cases, especially when adopting
the copyright approach, courts give careful attention to these two objectives,
balancing them against the countervailing interests of promoting free trade
and preserving First Amendment protection.78
73. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 446 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
74. Part VI of this article discusses the descendibility issue. See also infra text
accompanying notes 138-56.
75. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 446-47 (Bird, C.J., dissenting); see also 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)
(1988).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 8 (intending "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts").
77. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Melville
B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180-93 (1970).
78. See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-77; see also supra text accompanying notes 34-
38 and infra notes 163-64.
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2. Economic Incentive
The primary impetus behind copyright law is to encourage creative
endeavor by providing economic incentives to the creator.79 This rationale
has likewise played a prominent role in most right of publicity cases. In
Zacchini, the United States Supreme Court recognized the public interest
benefit of providing financial incentives to encourage artists and entertainers
in pursuing creative endeavors" and continuing to perform.8 The Court
specifically recognized "the State's interest [in recognizing a right of
publicity] is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law,
focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors
... ,82 By recognizing the publicity rights in Mr. Zacchini's perfor-
mance, the Court protected his drawing power and promoted his incentive
to perform.83
Other courts have also specifically recognized the economic incentive
policy behind protection of the right of publicity. In Lugosi, for example,
Chief Justice Bird noted how the right of publicity "creates a powerful
incentive for expending time and resources to develop the skills or
achievements prerequisite to public recognition."84  The Sixth Circuit
reached a similar conclusion in Memphis Development, discussed in Part V,
holding that "[t]he basic motivations [of performance] are.., the desire to
receive the psychic and financial rewards of achievement. . . ."" and
"should be regarded as... an economic opportunity available in the free
market system." 6  In Haelan, the Second Circuit also noted "many
-prominent persons ... would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money for authorizing advertisements, [or] popularizing their countenances
,87
While economic incentive is certainly a valid policy, it is not without
criticism. The economic incentive argument may fall short when used in the
context of an estate seeking to assert a post mortem publicity right of a
79. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988).
80. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 567-77.
81. Id. at 576.
82. Id. at 573.
83. Id. at 575-76.
84. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 441 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
85. Memphis Dev., 616 F.2d at 958.
86. Id. at 960.
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deceased celebrity, because a performer's primary incentive is usually fame
and fortune during his lifetime, rather than the ability to pass these
marketing rights onto his estate.8
Another potential drawback is that the economic incentive rationale
grants the celebrity or the celebrity's heirs a monopoly power over his or
her name and image. This monopoly control can lead to a general "chilling
effect," as the free and open exchange of information about the celebrity
may be restricted. 9 Ironically, although it was Chief Justice Bird who
propounded the free enterprise argument in Lugosi,9" she also expressed
this chilling effect criticism in a companion case, 9' stating "prominence
invites creative comment. Surely, the range of free expression would be
meaningfully reduced if prominent persons in the present and recent past
were forbidden topics for the imaginations of authors of fiction."92
3. Prevention of Unjust Enrichment
The second economic policy of publicity right protection is to prevent
infringers from unjust enrichment, i.e., "reaping what others have sown."'93
The United States Supreme Court in Zacchini, for instance, reasoned that to
allow Scripps-Howard to film and broadcast Mr. Zacchini's act without
compensating him would unjustly benefit the defendant at no cost beyond
its relatively insignificant production expense. 94 The Second Circuit also
noted that to allow the defendant in Factors to merchandize its unautho-
rized Elvis posters without compensating Presley's estate would result in
unjust enrichment by "grant[ing the defendant] a windfall in the form of
profits from the use of Presley's name and likeness."96 The Pennsylvania
88. See, e.g., Memphis Dev., 616 F.2d at 960 (recognizing the minimal motivation of
"allowing a person to pass on his fame for the commercial use of his heirs or assigns").
89. See id. (holding that the publicity right of a deceased performer does not outweigh
the unencumbered "commercial, aesthetic, and political use of the name, memory, and image
of the famous").
90. See supra text accompanying note 84.
91. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979).
92. Id. at 460, (Bird, C.J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
93. See Samuelson, supra note 38, at 850 (stating that "[b]oth [copyright and publicity
right] law are concerned not only with direct economic injury to the owner, but with
prevention of unjust enrichment as well") (citing Kevin S. Marks, Comment, An Assessment
of the Copyright Model in Right of Publicity Cases, 70 CAL. L. REV. 786, 795 (1982)).
94. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-76.
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court in Hogan97 reached a similar conclusion in awarding damages to Ben
Hogan to compensate him for the defendant's unjust enrichment in
appropriating Hogan's name.98 Other examples where the unjust enrich-
ment rationale has been applied to publicity rights include defendants'
unauthorized publications of pictures of Muhammad Ali,99 Cary Grant,'00
and author Jackie Collins Lerman.'
V. APPLYING COPYRIGHT LAW TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Interpreting the right of publicity under copyright inevitably incorpo-
rates many of the aspects inherent in copyright law. First, as discussed in
the preceding section, the two underlying policies behind copyright
law-promoting creative endeavor and preventing unjust enrichment-also
apply to the right of publicity. Second, as addressed in the following
section, both doctrines potentially involve First Amendment freedom of
speech conflicts. °2 Finally, both doctrines fail to provide clear standards
regarding the extent of protection for an actor's performance or style,
including whether or not such rights are assignable or descendible. This
section examines certain issues where the right of publicity may be used to
fill the gaps where copyright law does not provide adequate legal protection.
A. Protection of a Person's Likeness, Image, or Character
Most right of publicity cases involve the exclusive right and control of
a performer's image. Memphis Development0 3 is a typical example,
where the defendants marketed an unauthorized statuette of Elvis Presley.
The court adopted the traditional copyright approach, considering the
97. Hogan, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314; see supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
98. The court awarded Mr. Hogan $5000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 321-23.
99. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 728-29 (involving Playgirl's publication of an objectionable
portrait of the former champion to advertise its magazine).
100. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (involving the
magazine's superimposition of a photograph of Cary Grant's head onto the torso of a model
as part of an article dealing with clothing styles).
101. Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(involving a magazine's use of the plaintiff's name in a publication which included pictures
of a nude woman who the magazine incorrectly identified as the plaintiff).
102. The First Amendment is discussed in part VI of this article; see also infra text
accompanying notes 157-92.
103. Memphis Dev., 616 F.2d 956; see supra text accompanying note 15.
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personal interest in economic reward and societal interests in encouraging
performing arts. 0 4
Copyright law protects creative expression when fixed in a tangible
medium, but does not protect the ideas expressed. While this general rule
is a basic precept of copyright law, it becomes very unclear when applied
to a right of publicity situation. To illustrate, this rule does not provide any
clear standard of distinguishing between Bela Lugosi's personal features and
characteristics in his portrayal of Dracula, which could be considered
proprietary, from the Dracula character itself, to which Lugosi would not
have a proprietary claim.'0 5 This area of confusion presents a clear
example of how a properly developed right of publicity law can help fill a
void left open by copyright law.
B. Protection of a Performance
A second area where the right of publicity can fill certain legal gaps is
the protection of an actor's performance itself. Zacchini1 °6 still stands as
the seminal application of this concept, as the entire case revolved around
the protection of Mr. Zacchini's human cannonball performance.'0 7 In
reaching its decision, the Supreme Court strived to comply with the
underlying goals of promoting artistic endeavor by providing the financial
reward for the performer's investment into developing his act,0 8 and
preventing unjust enrichment to the infringer.0 9
C. Protection of Fictional Characters
Fictional characters, from Mickey Mouse and Tarzan, to Barney and the
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, are becoming an increasingly prevalent part
of American culture, and are the subject of much infringement litigation.
Protection of fictional characters is usually analyzed under copyright
law."0 Courts often employ the "story being told" standard,"' which
104. Id. at 958-59.
105. See, e.g., Factors, 579 F.2d at 221; Lerman, 521 F. Supp. at 232; Ali, 447 F. Supp.
at 728-29.
106. Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562; see supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
107. Id. at 563.
108. Id. at 576-77; see supra text accompanying notes 79-92.
109. Id. at 576; see supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
110. For a more detailed analysis of the legal protections of fictional characters, see
David B. Feldman, Finding a Home for Fictional Characters: A Proposal for Change in
Copyright Protection, 78 CAL. L. REV. 687 (1990); Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Lives
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holds that a character may only be protected under copyright law if "the
character really constitutes the story being told, but if the character is only
the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of the
protection afforded by the copyright."'" 2  Under this standard, a character
cannot receive copyright protection unless the character itself is the story
(i.e., the character is inseparable from the work in which it appears)." 3
Plaintiffs may also turn to the "protected expression" theory to protect their
fictional characters. The protected expression analysis looks beyond the
fictional character's mere physical appearances, delving further into the
character's expressions. This standard was used to find that Mickey
Mouse" 4 and the H.R. Puff n'Stuff characters"' were protectable apart
from the stories in which they appeared.
Copyright law is, however, flawed by many inherent voids in protecting
fictional characters. A character may not be entitled to copyright protection
if the character is not sufficiently delineated to be considered copyrightable.
Even when copyright law does apply, it may protect only the entire final
work," '6 but not the individual components of that work. Fictional
characters may thus be left virtually unprotected, especially as they migrate
into new works and other mediums. As a result, plaintiffs and courts may
of Fictional Characters. 1986 Wis. L. REv. 429 (1986); Dan D. Niro, Protecting Characters
Through Copyright Law: Paving a New Road Upon Which Literary, Graphic, and Motion
Picture Characters Can All Travel, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 359 (1992); Kenneth E. Spahn, The
Legal Protection of Fictional Characters, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 331 (1992).
111. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.. Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th
Cir.) (the Sam Spade case), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1954).
112. Id. at 950.
113. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.12, at 2-175. The Nimmer treatise
points out that the Sam Spade ruling denies copyright protections for all fictional characters,
because it "envisage[s] a 'story' devoid of plot wherein character study constitutes all, or
substantially all, of the work;" Id. Nimmer further concludes, "although the Sam Spade
[rule] protected [the author's] right to reuse his characters, the rule potentially relegated all
fictional characters to the public domain." Id.
114. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (concluding that the infringing character's visual similarities to Mickey
Mouse were substantial enough to constitute infringement). Id. at 756.
115. Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977). The McDonald's commercials featuring McDonaldland characters (Ronald
McDonald et al.) were found to so closely resemble the "total concept and feel" of Krofft's
Puffin'Stuff television program as to constitute copyright infringement. Id. at 1167. The
decision represented an important progression in fictional character protection, because the
court looked beyond the mere visual images of the characters themselves, and delved into the
entire setting and feel of the characters' environments.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.12.
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look to the right of publicity and other alternative legal doctrines to protect
fictional characters." 7
D. Protection of "Pure" Characters
Copyright law may provide little or no protection for creators of a
"pure" character, which is a character who does not appear in an incorpo-
rated work. Because the Copyright Act protects works," 8 a performer
who creates and develops a character such as Pee Wee Herman, the Church
Lady, or Hanz and Franz may not have any copyright protection in that
character unless the character is itself considered a work, or is incorporated
into a work of authorship, and is "fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion."' 
9
This weakness in copyright protection was dramatically evidenced in
Columbia Broadcasting System v. DeCosta.'2° Actor Victor DeCosta
created the fictional character "Paladin," which he portrayed at public
appearances, carnivals, rodeos, etc.' Ten years after his retirement,
DeCosta attempted to prevent CBS's use of an identical character in its
television show, Have Gun Will Travel.'22 The television character went
far beyond a mere resemblance, as CBS duplicated almost every detail of
DeCosta's creation. The CBS character, like DeCosta's character, was also
named "Paladin," was a good guy wearing a black outfit and a mustache,
came from San Francisco, used a chess knight as a trademark, and handed
out business cards bearing the chess knight and the inscription, "Have Gun
Will Travel, Wire Paladin, San Francisco."' Although the jury
found' 24 that CBS blatantly pirated almost every detail of DeCosta's
character, the actor was denied relief because his pure character had never
been incorporated into any copyrightable work. 21
117. See generallyFeldman, supra note 110; Kurtz, supra note 110; Spahn, supra note
110.
118. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
119. Id.
120. 377 F.2d 315 (Ist Cir. 1967).
121. Id. at 316.
122. Id. at 316-17.
123. Id. at 317.
124. Id. at 321.
125. 377 F.2d at 321. The court reasoned that DeCosta's public appearances did not
constitute a "tangible medium," and thus were not sufficient to provide copyright protection
for the character. Id.
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The court also denied DeCosta protection because he did not take the
affirmative step of copyrighting his performance, business cards, or
photos." 6 Note, however, that even if DeCosta had copyrighted his cards
and pictures, those copyrights would only have protected against reproduc-
tions of the actual cards or photos, not the Paladin pure character itself."7
Also note that neither trademark nor unfair competition law would have
protected DeCosta because his limited personal appearances would not have
been sufficient to establish a secondary meaning or create consumer
confusion between his character and the CBS show.1
28
Protection of pure characters represents another area where the right of
publicity can help fill in a gap left open by copyright and trademark law.
The right of publicity doctrine would protect Mr. DeCosta's performance,
as was done in Zacchini, as well as his style and character as in Groucho
Marx Productions, Russen, Price v. Hal Roach, and Chaplin v. Amador.
E. Applying the Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine, which is found in the federal Copyright Act,
provides that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,... scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright."'2 9  Certain infringements of a
copyright are thus permitted when the infringement furthers "the greater
126. Id. Although the business cards and photographs which DeCosta handed out did
satisfy the writing requirement to warrant copyright protection, the actor had not obtained
copyright on these materials, thus opening his character up to the public domain; see also
Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears. Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Even if the Paladin chess knight symbol was original,
it still would not "tangibly fix" DeCosta's character, which incorporates his cards, props,
characterization, performances, and physical appearance. See Michael V.P. Marks, The Legal
Rights of Fictional Characters, 25 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 35, 60 (1980).
128. Federal trademark law is governed under the Lanham Act, Title 15 of the United
States Code. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd. 604 F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1979); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Floralee Undergarment Co., Inc. 526 F. Supp 1187
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Ass'n, 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226 (1971); see also J.T. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 4, 5, 23 (2d ed. 1984); NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 2, § 2.12, at 2-178.1; Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition:
A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 314 (1979).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Factors used to determine whether infringement falls
under the fair use exception include: the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the
copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used; and the effect upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Id.
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public interest in the development of art, science and industry."'13 Fair
use also establishes a privilege to use copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without the copyright owner's consent,13 ' and is most commonly
applied in the case of parody. 3
2
The fair use doctrine was applied to the right of publicity in Namath
v. Sports fllustrated, 3 3 where quarterback Joe Namath claimed that an
advertisement for Sports fIlustrated magazine, featuring an issue of the
magazine with his picture on the cover, had violated his publicity right. The
court denied relief to Namath, finding the use of his picture was only
incidental, and raised no implication of his endorsement.'34 The use of
Namath's photograph was deemed incidental and thus permissible, as
compared to Scripps-Howard's unauthorized broadcast of Mr. Zacchini's act,
which was considered far more than incidental, having taken the performer's
"entire act."'35 The fair use doctrine was also argued by the defendants
in Groucho Marx Productions, but was rejected by the court.'36 Also note
that if the DeCosta court would have recognized a protectable interest in the
plaintiff's Paladin character, the fair use doctrine likely would not have
protected CBS, because the network's wholesale duplication of DeCosta's
character was clearly more than incidental. 37
130. Berlin v. E.C. Pubs., Inc. 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822
(1964).
13 1. Stephen S. Morrill, Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises: Emasculating
the Fair Use Accommodation of Competing Copyright and First Amendment Interests, 79
Nw. U. L. REv. 587, 610 (1984).
132. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (holding that rap
music group 2 Live Crew's parody of Roy Orbison's "Pretty Woman," although commercial
in nature, did not create a presumption against fair use of Orbison's copyrighted work);
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980). "A parody
is entitled ... to 'conjure up' the original." Id. at 253 n.1; see also Victor S. Netterville,
Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L.
REV. 225 (1962). But see Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. at 493 (denying fair use
defense when parody goes beyond conjuring up the original, to the point of wholesale
appropriation of the original's characterizations); supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
133. 352 N.E. 2d 584 (1976).
134. Id. at 386.
135. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.
136. Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. at 493-94; see supra text accompanying notes
21-23.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 120-28.
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VI. LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY DOCTRINE
As discussed in Parts IV and V, the theoretical policies behind the right
of publicity are essentially analogous to those of copyright law, which can
generally be applied to publicity right issues. Such application would help
resolve two primary limitations on the right of publicity law as it currently
exists: descendibility'38 and First Amendment conflicts.
A. Descendibility of Publicity Rights
One of the most debated issues concerning one's right of publicity is
whether that right dies with the person, or descends to the person's heirs or
estate.'39 This is particularly important, because publicity right cases often
involve the exploitation of a celebrity who is deceased, and must therefore
be brought by that celebrity's estate. 4
As with other publicity right issues, the descendibility question has no
uniform standard, and the answer varies from state to state and court to
court. In order to successfully assert a claim on behalf of the deceased, the
estate must first establish the existence of the decedent's right of publicity,
and the defendant's infringement upon that right. Even after successfully
meeting this burden, the estate may still be denied relief if that jurisdiction
does not recognize the right of publicity as descendible. 4 ' As a general
rule, publicity rights are not descendible when viewed under the privacy
model, as the Lugosi majority held,' 42.because a privacy right terminates
upon the death of the infringed person, and third parties, including the
celebrity's family, may not assert a legal interest in another person's
dignitary or emotional rights.
However, when analyzed under the property or copyright model, a
person's publicity rights become his personal property, and may descend to
138. For a more in-depth analysis of descendibility under the right of privacy doctrine,
see generally, Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 64, at 1129; Ginsberg, supra note 40; Andrew
B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 453 (1981).
139. The same analysis and arguments concerning the descendibility issue of publicity
rights apply equally as well to the transferability and assignability issues. This article
therefore limits its discussion to descendibility.
140. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Factors, 579 F.2d at 222; Memphis Dev., 441 F. Supp. at 1330.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 54-64.
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his estate upon death.'43  The Lugosi dissent agreed with the trial
court.. that publicity rights should be descendible. As Chief Justice Bird
concluded, "the right of publicity recognizes an interest in intangible
property similar in many respects to creations protected by copyright law
... [and] that body of law is [therefore] instructive."'45
The publicity rights of the deceased performer have been asserted most
frequently by the estate of Elvis Presley. In Russen,"' the estate was able
to prevent an unauthorized stage production which mimicked an Elvis
Presley concert147 The descendibility issue has, however, prevented the
Presley estate from prevailing in similar actions. In Memphis Develop-
ment, 48 the Sixth Circuit recognized that the defendant's unauthorized
production of Elvis statuettes violated "The King's" publicity rights, yet still
denied relief to his estate, because the law of Tennessee (the domicile of
Presley at his death) did not consider publicity rights to be survivable. 49
Presley's estate was also unable to prevent unauthorized production of Elvis
memorial posters in Factors,5 ' again because Tennessee law did not
recognize the descendibility of publicity rights.'
The Second Circuit followed its Factors decision in Groucho Marx
Productions,'52 denying the Marx Brothers' estates the right to assert the
comedians' post mortem publicity rights, because publicity rights were not
survivable under the law of the Brothers' domicile, California. Because the
California court in Lugosi defined the right of publicity as a privacy right
which terminates upon death, the New York court "conclude[d] that
143. See, e.g., Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1354-55; Price v. Hal Roach, 400 F. Supp. at
844; see also supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
144. Lugosi, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 551.
145. 603 P.2d at 446 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Justice Bird further suggested adopting
copyright law's life plus fifty years time period before celebrity's name and likeness become
public domain. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 72.
146. Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1382-83; see also supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
147. Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1382-83.
148. Memphis Dev., 616 F.2d 956, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); see also supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
149. Id. at 958.
150. Factors, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); see also
supra note 16.
151. Factors, 652 F.2d at 284. The Second Circuit initially granted relief to the
plaintiffs, recognizing the right of publicity as descendible under New York common law,
citing Factors, 579 F.2d 215, but then reversed its decision in response to the Memphis Dev.
holding that Tennessee law should govern. Id.
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California would not recognize a descendible right of publicity that protects
against an original play using a celebrity's likeness and comedic style."'
1 3
Other estates have been able to successfully assert the postmortem
publicity rights of a deceased celebrity, when thejurisdiction involved is one
which recognizes the right of publicity as descendible. New York allowed
the estates of Laurel and Hardy to assert the comedians' postmortem
publicity rights in the first case to recognize a descendible right of publicity,
Price v. Hal Roach,'54 and again in Price v. World-vision.' Georgia
has also recognized publicity rights as descendible in a case involving the
estate of Martin Luther King, Jr.'56
B. First Amendment Conflicts
The second major limitation to right of publicity protection concerns
First Amendment conflicts,'57 as any discussion regarding the use of a
person's name or likeness inherently involves freedom of speech and
freedom of press issues. 5 Defendants who are accused of infringing
upon a person's publicity rights often rely on the First Amendment as a
defense, which courts must weigh against the plaintiff's personal interests.
Any First Amendment issue, particularly free speech, will always invoke
strong judicial deference. The United States Supreme Court has affirmed
"the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences . . . .""' First Amendment
guarantees may also extend beyond newsworthy information to protect
entertainment 160 and citizens' privacy interests.' 6' In determining public-
153. Groucho Marx Prods., 689 F.2d at 323 (footnote omitted). Although the New
York court could not extend the right of publicity to the estate, it did, however, use the
misappropriation doctrine to find another basis on which to enjoin the defendant's play. Id.
154. 400 F. Supp. at 844 (concluding that "[t]here appears to be no logical reason to
terminate this right upon death of the person protected").
155. 455 F. Supp. at 266 (holding that the defendant's unauthorized Stan 'n Ollie
television program violated the comedians' publicity rights, which passed onto their heirs).
156. Martin Luther King, 508 F. Supp. at 866 (allowing the estate to prevent the
defendant from producing and distributing unauthorized plastic busts of Mr. King, Jr.).
157. See generally Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 57; Hannigan, supra note 38;
Samuelson, supra note 38.
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press ...").
159. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
160. Purely commercial speech receives only minimal First Amendment protection. See
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ity right issues, courts must weigh the publicity rights of the plaintiff against
the First Amendment protection of the defendant's infringing work. This
section briefly reviews the First Amendment considerations found in
publicity right cases, which typically involve either commercial exploitation
such as unauthorized advertisements and sale of commercial memorabilia,
or unauthorized biographies.
1. Commercial Exploitation
The First Amendment balancing test was dramatically put to test in
Zacchini,162 where the United States Supreme Court weighed the perform-
er's right of publicity against the defendant's First Amendment protection
to broadcast news. In holding for the plaintiff, the Court concluded the
newscast exceeded the bounds of the First Amendment protection, as it
appropriated the performer's "entire act."'163 The Court also considered
that its decision would not withhold the material completely from the public,
but merely determined who would benefit from its dissemination. 64
In Russen, 65 the New Jersey court acknowledged that First Amend-
ment protection may override the plaintiffs infringement claims when such
exploitation disseminates information or "contributes to society's cultural
enrichment,"' 66 but not when the exploitation is purely for commercial
gain. 67 Focusing on whether the defendant's expression "serve[d] a social
function valued by the protection of free speech,"' 6 the court found The
Big El Show to be a commercial exploitation "without contributing anything
of substantial value to society.' 69 The court concluded the show lacked
its own "creative component and [did] not have a significant value as pure
entertainment,"' 70 and therefore did not merit sufficient First Amendment
protection.' The Second Circuit reached a similar result in Groucho
161. By entering the realm of public figures, however, a person's privacy interest
protection under the First Amendment may be less than that afforded to private citizens. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
162. Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562.
163. Id. at 575.
164. Id.
165. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339; see supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
166. Id. at 1356.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1359.
170. Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1359.
171. Id. at 1361.
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Marx Productions,17 2 concluding that the defendant's musical play lacked
the creative component to constitute societal value, 73 and that any literary
or entertainment value of the infringing play was "substantially overshad-
owed . . . by the wholesale appropriation of the Marx Brothers charac-
ters. 174
An interesting and very different decision was reached in Paulsen v.
Personality Posters, Inc., ' when comedian Pat Paulsen mockingly
declared himself a candidate for President in the 1968 presidential election.
The defendants capitalized on the popularity of Paulsen's schtick by
merchandising "Pat Paulsen for President" posters, which Paulsen then
alleged were an unauthorized appropriation of his name and likeness.'76
Although the Supreme Court of New York agreed that the poster infringed
upon Paulsen's publicity rights, it still refused to grant him relief. Because
the poster was political, it warranted First Amendment protection, which
outweighed the privacy and publicity rights of the plaintiff. The court
reasoned that a presidential candidacy, even one that is a sham, is a
newsworthy matter, warranting First Amendment protection sufficient to
overcome an infringement claim.
77
The Factors78 defendants relied on Paulsen to argue their Elvis
memorial poster should also receive First Amendment protection, because
the death of "The King" was protected as a privileged celebration of a
newsworthy event. 179 This defense was, however, rejected, as the court
refused to classify the defendant's Elvis poster "in the same category as one
picturing a presidential candidate, albeit a mock candidate."'8 °
172. Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'don other grounds,
689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982): see supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
173. Id. at 493.
174. Id.
175. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
176. Id. at 503.
177. Id. at 507-08 (further stating "[w]hen a well-known entertainer enters the
presidential ring, tongue in cheek or otherwise, it is clearly newsworthy and of public
interest. . . . sufficiently relevant to a matter of public interest to be a form of expression
which is constitutionally protected and 'deserving of substantial freedom') (quoting Berlin,
329 F.2d at 545).
178. Factors, 579 F.2d 215.
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2. Unauthorized Books and Biographies
As discussed above, unauthorized appropriation of one's publicity rights
is generally entitled to only minimal First Amendment protection when used
for purely commercial exploitation. However, when such appropriation
takes the form of a book rather than a poster, statuette, stage production, or
rebroadcast, First Amendment protection is heightened, because of the high
literary value associated with (almost) any book. This issue arises most
commonly in the context of an unauthorized biography of a celebrity.
In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,'81 the defen-
dant's unauthorized biography of the late Howard Hughes was challenged
as an infringement upon the billionaire's publicity rights. The Supreme
Court of New York denied relief, holding that the First Amendment
protection inherent in the nonfiction book outweighed the deceased's
publicity rights. 82  This First Amendment protection has been extended
even further to protect fictional books. In Hicks v. Casablanca Rec-
ords,'83 the estate of mystery writer Agatha Christie challenged the
defendant's fictional novel about Christie as an infringement upon the
deceased author's right of publicity. In following the Rosemont holding, the
court ruled the First Amendment protection granted to the defendant's book
outweighed the plaintiff's publicity rights. As the court concluded, "the
[F]irst [A]mendment protection usually accorded novels and movies
outweighs whatever publicity rights plaintiffs may possess."' 4
This First Amendment deference given to books Was perhaps best
exemplified in Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap Inc.,'85 where Marilyn
Monroe's executor claimed that Norman Mailer's book, Marilyn, infringed
upon the late celebrity's right of publicity. The plaintiff argued the
defendant's book should not merit First Amendment protection because it
was not a true biography.'86 The court, however, soundly rejected this
argument, concluding:
181. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d I (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1968), aff'd mem., 32 A.D.2d 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
182. Id. at 7. The court further denied the descendibility of publicity rights, noting that
the "plaintiff, in any event, has no standing to assert another's right of privacy .... such
right is a purely personal one which may be enforced only by the party himself." Id.
183. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
184. Id. at 433. Note, however, that Ms. Christie would most likely have been able to
prevail under a right of privacy action, had she been alive when the book was published.
185. 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (App. Div. 1980).
186. Id. at 829.
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We think it does not matter whether the book is properly described as
a biography, a fictional biography, or any other kind of literary work.
It is not for a court to pass on literary categories, or literary judgment.
It is enough that the book is a literary work and not simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services. The
protection of the right of free expression is so important that we should
not extend any right of publicity, if such exists, to give rise to a cause
of action against the publication of a literary work about a deceased
person." 7
Thus, under the Frosch holding, a court will not delve into attempting to
draw a line between protected and non-protected books, but will almost
routinely grant First Amendment protection to any kind of literary work.
Courts apply a sliding scale in balancing a defendant's First Amend-
ment protection against the plaintiffs publicity rights. Newsworthy
information, political speech, and books receive maximum First Amendment
protection,"8 while purely commercial speech, which lacks the inherent
values considered worthy of constitutional protection,'89 warrants less
protection. Commercial memorabilia is entitled to even less (i.e., minimal)
protection, because it is considered to be exploitative, motivated entirely by
pecuniary return, and lacking any substantial informative or cultural values.
This multi-tiered standard is perhaps best exemplified by the two poster
cases. The Elvis poster in Factors was considered pure commercial
exploitation, void of any political significance, and therefore entitled to only
minimal First Amendment protection. The Paulsen poster, however,
qualified (arguably) as political speech, thereby invoking heightened First
Amendment protection which outweighed the comedian's publicity rights.
In general, a defendant's First Amendment protection may prevail over
the plaintiffs publicity rights when the infringement is found to contain
sufficient literary or informative value, 9 ' which the courts will almost
automatically find in books of any kind.' 9 ' An infringer's First Amend-
ment rights may also prevail if the infringement is limited to the minimum
187. 1d. (emphasis added).
188. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
189. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1359.
190. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389; Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. at 493; Russen,
513 F. Supp. at 1359.
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necessary to conjure up the plaintiff's unique character or style, especially
in the cases of parody, spoof, or satire.
192
VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION
A. Summary
The right of publicity may protect a person's name or likeness, his or
her actual performance, and even his or her unique style or characterization,
but it is still a very uncertain and murky area of law.'93 Right of publicity
issues involve many diverse and often conflicting individual and societal
interests. Issues such as an individual's privacy rights, whether or not
publicity rights are property, the descendibility of such rights, the employ-
er's interest in its work product, the underlying policies of encouraging
creative endeavor and preventing unjust enrichment, and the promotion of
free market competition must all be weighed against each other and against
society's interest in free speech.
This balancing act presents a very difficult task for the courts, resulting
in unclear standards and inconsistent results. In order to assert a right of
publicity claim, the plaintiff must establish the existence of his publicity
rights, and the infringement of these rights. After meeting these initial
burdens of proof, however, the plaintiff may still be denied relief if he has
not taken adequate copyright precautions, as in DeCosta; or when the
defendant's infringement is protected by the fair use doctrine, as in Namath;
or by the First Amendment, as in Paulsen, Rosemont, Hicks, and Frosch.
Even after all of these obstacles have been overcome, the right of publicity
may still not afford protection when the plaintiff's state does not recognize
the right of publicity, as in Factors, Groucho Marx Productions, and Carson
v. National Bank of Commerce; or, even when recognized, is not considered
to be descendible, as in Lugosi, Memphis Development, Groucho Marx
Productions, and Factors.
192. See Groucho Marx Prods., 689 F.2d at 492; Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 252;
Russen, 413 F. Supp. at 1359; see also Netterville, supra note 132, at 254.
193. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (stating "[tihe state of the [right of publicity] law is
still that of a haystack in a hurricane"); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp.
279, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (acknowledging that many courts address the right of publicity
under the guise of a right of privacy); Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 311 (stating "[t]he
ultimate contours of the right of publicity are as yet unclear"); Gordon, supra note 3, at 554;
Samuelson, supra note 38, at 836 (stating "[the right of publicity's] boundaries ... [and]
standards ... are not yet defined").
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B. Conclusion
The right of publicity reflects many of the attributes and policies found
in copyright law. One major difference, however, is that copyright law is
guided by a uniform national standard under the federal Copyright Act,
194
whereas right of publicity is inconsistent and varies by state. Some states
recognize the right of publicity statutorily,'95 other states only through
common law, 96 and still other states do not recognize publicity rights at
all. 197 Even when recognized, the durational limits of publicity rights also
vary from state to state.'98 The right is descendible in some states, but
terminates upon death in other states, and is inheritable in other states only
if the depicted person exercised the right during his or her lifetime.' 99
The right of publicity exists on a continuum. On one end, the
copyright theory may protect a purely fictional character such as a comic
book or cartoon character, while on the other end, the privacy theory may
protect the celebrity himself. A jointly created image such as Count
Dracula, however, falls uncomfortably in between the two extremes. The
end product is a synthesis of the actor's distinct performance, and the
studio's enhancement of costume, makeup, lighting, and direction. The
closer an actor's character resembles the actor himself, the less copyright
protection the character will receive. This is, after all, "the penalty an
author must bear for marking [his or her characters] too indistinctly." '
The right of publicity is bound to become a pertinent issue as the O.J.
Simpson saga continues to unfold. Mr. Simpson's trial, and its ensuing
media frenzy, may thus create precedent in areas of law well beyond
criminal prosecution.
194. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988).
195. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at §§ 6.2-.15 (discussing the statutory protection
provided in thirteen states: California, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada,
New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
196. Id. § 6.1[C] (discussing states such as Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, which recognize a common law
right of publicity).
197. Id. § 6.1 [B] at 6-6 (stating that the right of publicity is recognized either by statute
or under common law, in less than half of the states).
198. See id. § 6.3[A].
199. See id.
200. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
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Right of publicity protection is currently in a state of flux, marred by
a lack of uniformity and standards. The result is confusion, inconsistency,
and a lack of predictability in this legal arena. Publicity rights have
traditionally been considered under the privacy doctrine, which the Lugosi
majority adopted. Applying the privacy doctrine, however, is not the right
solution. The privacy model may not provide adequate protection for a
public figure, is not intended to protect a person's proprietary or financial
interests, and does not recognize publicity rights as descendible. The
privacy doctrine should not be allowed to drift so far from its conceptual
mooring as to interfere with the objectives and rationale of publicity rights.
Rather, the right of publicity should be recognized as a body of law distinct
and separate from the right of privacy.
A uniform standard guideline to define publicity rights, as found with
federal copyright, patent, and trademark law, would provide such guidance
to state courts. This national standard would provide uniformity and
predictability to a murky and uncertain arena, accommodate the underlying
policies behind publicity and copyright law, and reduce potential First
Amendment conflicts. A uniform right of publicity doctrine, if properly
developed, can provide the legal protection needed to fill the voids left open
by current copyright, trademark, and privacy law. This will play a
particularly important role when attempting to protect creations such as an
actor's style or characterization, live performances, fictional characters, and
pure characters-in essence, a performer's identity.
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